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Abstract
To defeat security threats such as man-in-the-middle
(MITM) attacks, Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) 4.2 and 5.x
introduce the Secure Connections Only mode, under which
a BLE device accepts only secure paring protocols includ-
ing Passkey Entry and Numeric Comparison from an ini-
tiator, e.g., an Android mobile. However, the BLE spec-
ification does not explicitly require the Secure Connection
Only mode of the initiator. Taking the Android’s BLE pro-
gramming framework for example, we found that it cannot
enforce secure pairing, invalidating the security protection
provided by the Secure Connection Only mode. The same
problem applies to Apple iOS too.
Specifically, we examine the life cycle of a BLE pairing
process in Android and identify four severe design flaws.
These design flaws can be exploited by attackers to perform
downgrading attacks, forcing the BLE pairing protocols to
run in the insecure mode without the users’ awareness. To
validate our findings, we selected and tested 18 popular BLE
commercial products and our experimental results proved
that downgrading attacks and MITM attacks were all pos-
sible to these products. All 3501 BLE apps from Andro-
zoo are also subject to these attacks. For defense, we have
designed and implemented a prototype of the Secure Con-
nection Only mode on Android 8 through the Android Open
Source Project (AOSP). We have reported the identified BLE
pairing vulnerabilities to Bluetooth Special Interest Group
(SIG), Google, Apple, Texas Instruments (TI) and all of them
are actively addressing this issue. Google rated the reported
security flaw a High Severity.
1 Introduction
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is a widely adopted wireless
communication technology and is broadly adopted in IoT
such as medical applications including blood pressure mon-
itoring and X-ray imaging as well as wearable technologies.
[1]. BLE has two salient features: low energy consumption
to increase the lifetime of battery-powered BLE devices
and a development framework - GATT (Generic Attribute
Profile) to allow mobile, tablet and PC applications for
arbitrary data transmission to peer BLE devices.
BLE relies on a pairing protocol to ensure the communi-
cation security. Two pairing devices authenticate each other
and negotiate a secret key to encrypt the communication
channel. To achieve this goal, latest versions of the specifica-
tion including Bluetooth 4.2 [2] and 5.x [3, 4] offer four pair-
ing protocols: Just Works, Passkey Entry, Numeric Compar-
ison and Out Of Band (OOB). Just Works is not secure and
OOB is rarely used due to the extra hardware cost. There-
fore, we denote Passkey Entry and Numeric Comparison as
practical secure pairing protocols and will focus on the secu-
rity analysis of these two pairing protocols.
The latest BLE 4.2 [2] and 5.x [3] add the new Secure
Connections Only mode for BLE enabled devices to address
vulnerabilities found in previous Bluetooth pairing protocols
[5–20]. Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks in [19, 20] work
against Bluetooth Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) of Bluetooth
Classic 2.1 and 3.0, in which two Bluetooth devices under
SSP use only I/O capabilities (such as display and keyboard)
to determine the pairing protocol. An attacker can falsely de-
clare their I/O capabilities and conduct an MITM attack [21–
23]. With BLE 4.2 and 5.x, if the Secure Connections Only
mode is enabled in a BLE device, the BLE device is forced to
authenticate the user/mobile device with secure pairing pro-
tocols. It is expected that the Secure Connections Only mode
will enforce secure pairing to defeat the MITM attack.
However, BLE does not explicitly specify such a Secure
Connections Only mode for a connection initiator such as
a mobile device (more details are available in Section 2.4).
Without the Secure Connections Only mode being enforced
at the initiator side, the initiator, e.g., a mobile, is not re-
quired to authenticate the BLE device. We find such vulner-
abilities exist in both Android and iOS systems and believe
that this problems is a protocol level issue. That is, all BLE
systems following the BLE specification will have this prob-
lem. In this paper, however, we will focus on the Android
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system with brief discussion on the iOS system due to the
page limit.
After examining the initiation, status management, error
handling and bond management throughout the life cycle of a
pairing process in the Android programming framework, we
identify four design flaws which, if not properly addressed,
cannot enforce the Secure Connections Only mode.
• An Android app cannot specify any pairing protocol
even if it knows its peer BLE device’s capable pairing
protocols;
• An Android app cannot cancel an insecure pairing pro-
cess until the pairing process is completed;
• A fake device may poke an Android device and inten-
tionally create pairing errors. Android mishandles those
pairing errors without notifying the app and the user;
• Even if an app knows insecure pairing is used, Android
does not provide a mechanism to remove the previously
generated key or start a new secure pairing process with
the specific peer BLE device.
The four Android BLE design flaws cause serious security
issues. For example, if an Android mobile was paired with
a peer BLE device through secure pairing protocols, then
a fake/spoofing device can downgrade the pairing protocol,
pair with an Android mobile using insecure pairing protocol
(i.e., Just Works) or even communicate in plaintext and in-
ject data into the Android device and the corresponding BLE
app. Note that the Identity Resolving Key (IRK) is designed
to prevent a mobile from leaking its MAC address and thus
being tracked. With these security flaws, a fake device can
pair with the victim mobile using Just Works and obtain the
mobile’s IRK and MAC address to track the mobile device.
Even worse, the fact that Android cannot enforce secure pair-
ing causes damages beyond the mobile itself. A BLE device
may implement a whitelist that allows only previously paired
mobile devices to connect or to access services. An attacker
can now collect the mobile device’s MAC address and IRK
to bypass the whitelist-based filtering.
To solve these security issues, we believe that the Android
system shall be able to enforce the Secure Connections Only
mode such that a BLE app can specify and enforce a secure
pairing protocol. If secure pairing is enforced on Android, a
mobile device user has to see pairing BLE devices and make
the decision physically to disable/proceed with the pairing
process. If the pairing device is a fake device, the fake device
will be identified by the user and any following attacks shall
fail. The secure connections only mode at the app side will
not create any conflict with peer devices. Practically, the
app and its peer device know each other’s capabilities and
shall be able to enforce the secure connections only mode if
secure pairing is desired and their I/O capabilities support it.
We advocate the option of the secure connections only mode
for the app so that the app can defeat various attacks. If the
option is not used, BLE shall run compatibly.
Our major contributions are summarized as follows.
• For the first time, we find that BLE does not require the
Secure Connections Only mode for a pairing initiator
such as a mobile phone. The lack of mutual authen-
tication with Secure Connections Only mode at both
the mobile and its peer device in the BLE specification
causes security vulnerabilities.
• Based on our finding on BLE specification security
flaws, we tested and proved that both Android and iOS
do not provide a programming framework for BLE apps
to enforce security pairing. Specifically, four design
flaws were identified in Android leading to security vul-
nerabilities on Android mobiles and peer BLE devices.
• Thorough experimentation was performed on BLE apps
running on the latest versions of Android and 18 com-
mercial BLE devices. Not surprisingly, all 3501 BLE
apps from Androzoo [24] are subject to downgrading
and MITM attacks. In our experiments, the line-of-sight
attacking distance can reach 76 meters.
• Security defenses and solutions are proposed and pro-
totyped to enhance the Secure Connections Only mode
for Android by enforcing secure pairing protocols
through the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) [25].
Our case study on BLE keyboards further prove that the
Numerical Comparison protocol is more secure than the
Passkey Entry protocol even if both the mobile and the
peer device enforce secure pairing. Therefore, for mis-
sion critical BLE apps and devices, we suggest that Nu-
merical Comparison will be used on the mobile and on
BLE devices to provide higher security assurance.
Responsible Disclosures: We have reported our findings
to Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG), Google Android
Security Team, Apple, and Texas Instruments (TI) Product
Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT). The Bluetooth
SIG acknowledged our findings and is currently working
with Google to address the issues. The Google Android
Security Team also acknowledged the four design flaws in
Section 3 and rated the identified Android vulnerabilities
as High severity [26]. They are actively working with us
to patch Android. TI’s PSIRT has released a patched SDK
to “Update authentication parameters when transitioning be-
tween authenticated/non-authenticated pairing” based on the
reported vulnerabilities of TI’s BLE stack [27, 28].
Roadmap: The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
We introduce BLE in Section 2 and present the BLE pairing
process flaws in Section 3. Section 4 presents the down-
grading attacks exploiting the design flaws. Case studies are
presented in Section 5. Section 6 discusses various counter-
measures including the enforced secure paring in Android.
Section 7 evaluates the attacks and countermeasures. Sec-
tion 8 discusses securing pairing on iOS and other potential
solutions to BLE security. Related work is presented in Sec-
tion 9 and we conclude the paper in Section 10.
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Figure 1: BLE protocol stack
2 Background
In this section, we will first present an overview of BLE,
and then introduce the connection setup process, the pairing
process, and the Secure Connections Only mode. We will
also introduce the Attribute Protocol (ATT).
2.1 BLE Overview
BLE is a short-range communications technology. Figure
1 shows its protocol stack where a blood pressure monitor is
used as exemplary BLE device. In this example, the appli-
cation on the blood pressure monitor measures blood pres-
sure. The blood pressure monitor application and the mo-
bile app use the BLE core system for communication. BLE’s
core system consists of two building blocks, LE controller
and host. The LE controller uses the link layer and physi-
cal layer to create a connection for sending/receiving data.
BLE’s physical layer uses frequency hopping for communi-
cation, where data is exchanged over a sequence of hopping
frequencies. The frequency hopping sequence is negotiated
between two devices. The host implements multiple pro-
tocols including the Security Manager Protocol (SMP) and
ATT for secure communication over the connection. ATT is
used to format the transmitted data. SMP uses pairing pro-
tocols to negotiate cryptographic keys for data encryption,
integrity and other purposes. The Host Controller Interface
(HCI) moves the data, e.g., blood pressure measurements or
SMP control commands, from the host to the LE controller
through a physical interface, a function call or other venues
depending on specific implementations.
2.2 Connection Setup
Steps 1 to 4 in Figure 2 illustrate a typical BLE connec-
tion setup process. Exact information exchanged at each step
varies based on different applications. In Step 1, the blood
pressure monitor broadcasts advertising packets indicating
its availability. When a mobile app is launched, the app uti-
Blood Pressure Monitor
①  Advertisements
②  Scan request
③  Scan response
④  Connection request
 ⑥ Pairing features exchange
⑩ Transport specific key distribution
 Pairing process (optional) 
Connection setup
Encrypted ccommunication begins
⑤ Security request (optional)
Master                                                                                                                     Slave
User     Mobile
Further communication 
 ⑦ Public key exchange
⑧ Authentication stage 1: (Just Works, 
 Passkey-Entry, Numeric Comparison, OOB)
⑨ Authentication stage 2 & LTK calculation
Figure 2: Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) communication
lizes the Host and receives the advertisements. In Step 2,
the mobile app sends a scan request to the monitor. In Step
3, the blood pressure monitor responds with a scan response
packet. The mobile app uses advertising and scanning to col-
lect information about the blood pressure monitor such as the
monitor’s name, the MAC address and primary services. In
Step 4, the mobile app can now decide if the device is the one
of interest and send the connection request to build the con-
nection. The frequency hopping increment is included in the
connection request which determines the frequency hopping
sequence that the mobile and the blood pressure monitor will
follow in the communication. Here the mobile is called the
master/initiator for its role in initiating the connection. The
peer BLE device, the blood pressure monitor in this case, is
called the slave/responder.
2.3 Pairing Process
After two BLE devices build a connection, if no device
explicitly requests pairing, the communication continues in
plaintext. The two devices need to explicitly start the pairing
process to negotiate keys and encrypt the communication.
Steps 5 to 9 in Figure 2 illustrate a typical pairing process.
A mobile app can initiate the pairing process through SMP
(see Figure 1). The end-user can also use the system setting
app to start the pairing process.
2.3.1 Phase 1 - Pairing feature exchange
Step 5 - Security request (optional). As a slave device, the
blood pressure monitor can send a security request and ask
the mobile (master) to initiate the pairing process.
Step 6 - Pairing feature exchange. The mobile app sends
out a pairing request and the blood pressure monitor returns
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a pairing response. The two devices then announce their In-
put/Output (I/O) capabilities such as keyboard and display,
authentication requirements and the BLE version so that a
suitable common pairing protocol can be negotiated. (i) The
authentication requirements can be bonding and MITM pro-
tection. Bonding means that the keys generated during the
pairing process will be saved for later use to reduce delay
caused by the future pairing process. If a device wants to de-
fend against the MITM attack, the MITM flag [29] must be
specified so that the Passkey Entry protocol or the Numeric
Comparison protocol will be adopted. The exchanged I/O
capabilities will help select communication protocol since
different pairing protocols require different I/O capabilities.
For example, Numeric Comparison requires a display on
both devices. If authentication requirements are requested
but I/O features cannot support the specified secure pairing,
according to the BLE specification, the communication shall
be terminated and the user will be notified. (ii) If the two
devices explicitly set the MITM flag as false, Just Works is
selected and Just Works cannot defend against the MITM
attack. (iii) The BLE version is indicated in the Secure Con-
nections (SC) bit. If the mobile and peer device set the SC
bit, BLE 4.2 and above will be adopted. Otherwise, the BLE
legacy pairing method is used. We focus on only BLE 4.2
and above in this paper.
2.3.2 Phase 2 - Key exchange and authentication
Step 7 - Public key exchange. The Elliptic-curve
Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) key exchange protocol is per-
formed so that master and slave devices obtain each other’s
public key and generate a symmetric key, DHKey.
Step 8 - Authentication stage 1 (a critical step to BLE se-
curity). In this step, authentication related information is ex-
changed between the two devices. A pin is entered if Passkey
Entry is used. A 6-digit number is displayed at the two de-
vices if Numeric Comparison is used. A verification proce-
dure will also run to make sure the public keys exchanged in
Step 7 are from the intended devices.
Step 9 - Authentication stage 2 and LTK calculation. The
previously exchanged authentication information including
DHKey is used to generate the MacKey and Long Term Key
(LTK) at the two pairing devices. MacKey is used in a pro-
cess to ensure both devices generate the same LTK. If bond-
ing is required in Step 6, LTK is saved for future session
key generation and link encryption. BLE defines two types
of keys, unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection keys for
Just Works and authenticated-and-MITM-protection keys for
Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison and OOB.
To help readers better understand these communication
protocols, we briefly introduce them below with more details
in [2].
Passkey Entry: During the pairing process, one device
such as a mobile needs to display a 6-digit pin, and the user
inputs the pin on the other device using a keypad/keyboard.
The authentication stage 1 in Step 8 will fail if the attacker
does not know the pin.
Numeric Comparison (BLE 4.2 and beyond): Numeric
Comparison is applicable when both devices have displays
and confirmation buttons. After the ECDH key exchange,
the two BLE devices exchange a pair of nonces in Step 8. A
function is then used to convert the exchanged public keys
and nonces into a six-digit number. Each device displays
the number [30]. The user confirms that the two displayed
numbers are the same by pressing the “Yes” button on each
device’s display to proceed the pairing process. The fact that
the two displayed numbers are the same ensures that the ex-
changed two pubic keys are from the two intended pairing
devices, other than from an an attacker.
Out of Band (OOB): In OOB, a secret is shared with an
out-of-band venue such as near-field communication (NFC)
and the LTK is derived from this secret. If the OOB venue is
secure, the MITM attack can be defeated.
Just Works: It is designed for devices without I/O capa-
bilities [2] and is subject to MITM attacks. Just Works has
almost the same pairing process as Numeric Comparison ex-
cept that the generated number is not displayed and the user
has cannot ensure the exchanged pubic keys are the same.
2.3.3 Phase 3 - Key distribution
The communication after Phase 2 will be encrypted with a
SessionKey generated from LTK. BLE Encryption uses AES-
CCM (Counter with CBC-MAC) and one SessionKey pro-
vides authentication and confidentiality.
In Phase 3, the master and slave can exchange keys includ-
ing the Identity Resolving Key (IRK) for device identity and
privacy. BLE devices such as mobiles can be tracked if the
MAC address is used in advertisement and in later communi-
cation. BLE addresses this privacy issue by IRK and a suite
of protocols. IRK is used to generate resolvable private ad-
dresses in advertisement and communication. Only a device
with privacy requirements needs to distribute its IRK and its
real MAC address to its peer device. For example, if a mobile
needs to protect its MAC address, it distributes its IRK and
real MAC address to its peer device first. Then, the mobile
uses this IRK to generate a resolvable private address for its
packets and the peer device uses the mobile’s IRK to resolve
the private address. If the peer device needs to protect its
MAC address, it sends its own IRK and MAC address to the
device for private address generation and resolution although
such it is rarely used in practice.
2.4 Secure Connections Only Mode
For a slave device that provide services, the BLE spec-
ification defines the Secure Connections Only mode. This
mode provides the highest BLE security level (Mode 1, Level
4 [31]), in which only the three secure pairing protocols,
Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison and secure OOB, can
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be used and the BLE Legacy is not allowed. In this mode, if
secure pairing is not used, the device shall send the Pairing
Failed packet with the error code “Authentication Require-
ments”.
According to the BLE specification [32], when a device
is in the Secure Connections Only mode, “The device shall
only accept new outgoing and incoming service level con-
nections for services that require Security Mode 1, Level 4
when the remote device supports LE Secure Connections and
authenticated pairing is used.” Here the service level connec-
tion refers to the application layer connection. It can be ob-
served that BLE specifies the use of the Secure Connections
Only mode for a slave that provides services, e.g. the blood
pressure monitor in Figure 2. However, the BLE specifica-
tion does not explicitly define (or require) the Secure Con-
nections Only mode for a master, e.g. the mobile in Figure
2.
2.5 ATT Protocol
The Attribute Protocol (ATT) is a server/client protocol
with one BLE device as the server and the peer BLE device
as the client. For example, the app on the mobile device is a
client and the blood pressure monitor is a server in Figure 2.
A server maintains services in the format of attributes [33].
The client requests data from the server.
An attribute has four properties: an attribute handle, a uni-
versally unique identifier (UUID), a value, and a set of per-
missions. The attribute handle is used to uniquely identify
and access the attribute. If a client wants to read an attribute
from a server, it issues a read request to the server with the
handle. The UUID refers to the data type. The permis-
sion protects attributes on a device and specifies the secu-
rity levels required in order to access attributes. The permis-
sions include read/write, encrypted read/write, authenticated
read/write, and authorized read/write. A read/write attribute
can be accessed with no restrictions. An encrypted read-
/write attribute can only be accessed when pairing is applied
and the link is encrypted. An authenticated read/write at-
tribute can only be accessed when the link is encrypted with
an authenticated-and-MITM-protection keyAn attribute with
the authorized read/write permission can be accessed after
authorization1. It can be observed that the permission type
is related to the pairing protocol type. If the attribute such
as the keyboard input is sensitive, a high security level like
authenticated read/write shall be used so that secure pairing
protocols are used to counter eavesdropping and MITM at-
tacks, and prevent keystroke leaking.
A Bluetooth profile specifies functionalities and features
of each layer shown in Figure 1 for a particular class of appli-
cations. A BLE device can implement the Generic Attribute
Profile (GATT), which is built upon the ATT protocol, to ex-
change arbitrary data in the format of attributes with its peer
1The BLE specification does not explain its usage in detail.
Table 1: Summary of design flaws
Pairing stage Design flaw
Initiation No mechanism to specify a pairing
protocol
Status
management
No mechanism to timely obtain the
negotiated pairing protocol
Error
handling
Mishandling pairing errors
Bond
management
No mechanism to remove a suspicious
bond and start a new secure pairing
process with a bonded device
devices. GATT assigns attributes into services and more de-
tails can be found in Appendix A.
3 Design Flaws in Android BLE Program-
ming Framework
As we mentioned earlier, the BLE specification defines the
Secure Connections Only mode to ensure high security lev-
els. With the Secure Connections Only mode enabled in a
BLE device, the device will require secure pairing protocols
to authenticate the initiator. But this mode is not enforced
for the pairing initiator, e.g., a mobile, so the mobile is not
required to authenticate the device. The lack of the mutual
authentication with Secure Connections Only mode at both
the device is in fact the cause of identified BLE security vul-
nerabilities.
Interestingly, this insecure practice is strictly followed by
modern BLE designs. Our analysis on the Android BLE
programming framework proves that Android does not ap-
ply the Secure Connections Only mode. We examined the
initiation, status management, error handling and bond man-
agement throughout the life cycle of a pairing process and
identified four design flaws in Android as shown in Table 1.
Design Flaw 1 - No mechanisms to specify a pairing
protocol. The function createBond() in Listing 1 is the only
function an Android app can use to start the pairing process
with a peer BLE device. It does not accept any input param-
eter and the Android app cannot specify any pairing protocol
even if it knows its peer BLE device’s I/O capabilities. The
return value of this function, true or false, indicates if the
pairing process has been successfully started. It can be ob-
served from Listing 1 that createBond() checks if the mobile
device has an LTK in the device. If an LTK is available,
createBond() returns false and will not re-pair with the peer
device since the mobile device was paired with the device.
It can also be observed that createBond() is an asynchronous
call and does not wait for the pairing process to complete.
Since Android OS services handle the pairing process, an
Android app cannot pause or cancel the pairing process until
the pairing is finished.
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1 boolean createBond () {
2 enforceCallingOrSelfPermission(
BLUETOOTH_ADMIN_PERM ,"Need BLUETOOTH ADMIN
permission");
3 // Checking the bluetooth admin permission
4 DeviceProperties deviceProp =
mRemoteDevices.getDeviceProperties(device);
5
6 //if already paired , return false
7 if (deviceProp != null && deviceProp.
getBondState () != BluetoothDevice.BOND_NONE
) {
8 return false;
9 }
10 ......
11 //put a create bond message into the
message processing queue
12 Message msg = obtainMessage(
BondStateMachine.CREATE_BOND);
13 sendMessage(msg);
14 return true;
15 }
Listing 1: The function createBond() (Android 9.0)
Design Flaw 2 - No mechanisms to obtain the nego-
tiated pairing protocol on time. Android provides asyn-
chronous mechanisms for an app to know the status of a pair-
ing process after pairing is completed. Through the intent
ACTION_BOND_STATE_CHANGED, the app knows pairing sta-
tus including pairing in progress (BOND_BONDING, pair-
ing failure ( BOND_NONE), or pairing succeeded ( BOND_BON
DED). Through the intent ACTION_PAIRING_REQUEST, the
app knows either Passkey Entry or Numeric Comparison is
adopted. By registering both intents ACTION_BOND_STAT
E_CHANGED and ACTION_PAIRING_REQUEST (see more in
Listing 2 in Appendix B), an app knows the adopted pairing
protocol, Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison, Just Works
or plaintext communication only after the pairing process is
completed.
The fact that an Android app knows the negotiated pairing
protocol only after the pairing is completed breeds a secu-
rity vulnerability of stealing a mobile’s MAC address and
IRK through the pairing process as shown in Section 4.3.
To defeat such attacks, we need to be able to tear down the
connection at the time the pairing strategy is determined by
exchanged I/O capabilities and before the MAC address and
IRK are exchanged during the pairing process, rather than
after the pairing process is completed.
Design Flaw 3 - Android mishandles pairing errors.
The Android Bluetooth service and stack do not memorize a
negotiated pairing protocol. Further, Android does not pro-
vide APIs for apps to process pairing errors properly. Two
possible pairing related errors in Android are introduced
below.
Pin or Key Missing (0x06): When an Android mobile and
its peer BLE device are paired, their communication link is
encrypted with the negotiated keys including the LTK. If a
peer BLE device’s LTK is intentionally removed, the device
will send an error code 0x06 to the Android mobile during
the connection process. But the Android mobile will not no-
tify the user of this error. Instead, it will automatically com-
municate with the peer device in plaintext. Moreover, there
are no APIs or mechanisms for an Android App to know the
0x06 error ever occurred.
The incorrect processing of the 0x06 error also creates a
conflict between the bonding state and the link encryption
state. When the 0x06 error occurs, Android does not re-
move the corresponding LTK, which is supposed to encrypt
the communication. The communication will be in plaintext
while an Android app may use the Android reflection tech-
nique [34] to call a system level function isEncrypted() in
order to check if the communication is in plaintext. How-
ever, the reflection technique is not allowed in the newer API
since “Using such methods or fields has a high risk of break-
ing your app” [35].
Insufficient Authentication (0x05): When an Android mo-
bile tries to access an attribute with the encrypted read-
/write or authenticated read/write permission at the peer
BLE device, the device will check whether the link is en-
crypted or a secure pairing protocol is used. If not, the peer
device sends an error code 0x05, Insufficient Authentica-
tion, to the Android mobile. After receiving the error code
0x05, the Android mobile’s Bluetooth service starts a pair-
ing process automatically for the app. The app can learn if
the error occurs by checking the attribute access state code
via a callback function onCharacteristicRead. The state
code is GATT_INSUFFICIENT_AUTHENTICATION when
the above error occurs. However, the app cannot stop the
pairing process in this callback function. An attacker may
spoof a paired device and utilize this 0x05 error to start a
pairing process with an Android mobile. This design flaw
can be exploited to get the Android mobile’s MAC address
and IRK.
Design Flaw 4 - No mechanisms to remove a suspicious
bond and to start a new secure pairing process with a
bonded device. A third-party Android app cannot remove
a bond from the mobile’s list of bonded devices although
the user can manually remove the bond with the system set-
tings app. The function removeBond() can delete an LTK
associated with the previously connected BLE device, it is
a system level API and is not accessible by third party apps.
Assuming that an Android app finds the insecure pairing Just
Works is used, the app is able to break the connection. How-
ever, breaking the connection does not remove the bond, nor
are the generated keys removed. The app can not start a new
secure pairing process with a bonded device using create-
Bond(.) either.
4 Downgrade Attacks
This section presents the threat model, attack overview,
concrete attacks against mobiles and beyond mobiles.
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4.1 Threat Model
Our attacks against Android mobiles take the following
assumptions. We believe that the assumptions can be eas-
ily fulfilled. (i) An attacker can obtain the same type of a
victim device to explore its apps and communication proto-
cols. For example, the attacker can purchase the same blood
pressure monitor. (ii) The attacker cannot physically access
and unlock the mobile. (iii) Our attacks do not need mali-
cious apps installed on the mobile, one difference to many
other attacks which require malicious apps for Bluetooth ex-
ploitation [5, 14, 36, 37]. (iv) Before the attack, the Android
mobile and its peer device are paired using secure pairing
protocols such as the Passkey Entry and Numerical Com-
parison. (v) The Android app is created using the official
Android BLE programming framework.
4.2 Attack Overview
Our attacks involve four parties, the sniffer, the blocker, a
fake BLE device and a fake mobile. The Adafruit Bluefruit
LE Sniffer [38] is used to sniff BLE communication and col-
lect basic information such as the device MAC address and
the name from advertising packets and scan response pack-
ets. We use Texas Instruments (TI) CC2640 [39] develop-
ment boards to simulate the blocker, the fake BLE device
and the fake mobile.
A blocker can launch a Denial of Service (DoS) attack and
block a victim BLE device from connecting to a victim mo-
bile so that a fake/spoofing device can connect to the victim
mobile. We consider the following approaches. (i) A jammer
can be used to block the service of a victim device (not ap-
plied in this paper). (ii) A mobile acting as a master initiates
a connection to its peer BLE device which acts as a slave.
The number of connections to a slave is often limited. BLE
4.2 and above allow multiple connections while the number
of connections is up to the implementation [2, 40]. For exam-
ple, BLE 4.2 devices in our experiments allow one or three
connections to the slave. In case a slave allows multiple mas-
ters, multiple blockers can be used to connect to the victim
BLE device and perform the DoS. Please note that connect-
ing is different from pairing. A blocker can always connect
to a victim peer device if no other smart device is connected
to the victim device and even if the peer device requires se-
cure pairing. Once enough blockers are connected to the vic-
tim device, no other smart device can connect to it. (iii) A
fake BLE device may increases its advertising frequency and
connects to the victim mobile so that the victim device with
the same MAC address cannot connect to the victim mobile.
Our experiments in Section 7.3 have validated this approach
and no blockers are needed.
The fake BLE device and fake mobile are full-fledged
BLE devices and are also denoted as spoofing device and
spoofing mobile. The BLE attack can be performed in the
following steps. First, a fake device emulates a victim de-
vice. The attacker can use a sniffer to obtain the MAC ad-
dress and name of a BLE device. A fake device is then con-
figured to have the same MAC address and name as the vic-
tim BLE device. It can forge advertising and scan response
packets that contain the same device name and service de-
scription as those of the victim device. The fake device can
implement the same attributes of the victim device and ma-
nipulate the permissions of these attributes. Second, a fake
mobile emulates a victim mobile. This requires that the fake
mobile know the victim mobile’s MAC address and IRK
which is proved possible and will be demonstrated shortly.
During an attack, the four parties will coordinate by the
attacker to achieve a particular goal. For example, a blocker
can be used to block a victim device so that the victim mobile
will connect to the fake device. When the fake device is
connected to the mobile, the attacker can change parameters
of the BLE protocol such as the I/O capabilities. She can also
intentionally create errors to poke the mobile. When the fake
device is connected to the victim mobile, the fake mobile can
then connect to the victim device to perform a MITM attack,
in which the fake device and fake mobile simulated by TI
CC2640 can communicate through a UART port.
4.3 Downgrade Attacks against Mobiles
We now show how an attacker can weaponize the design
flaws in Section 3, downgrade the pairing protocol estab-
lished between a victim mobile and peer device, and perform
more complicated attacks.
False data injection via Design Flaw 3: To launch this
attack, the fake device intentionally creates an error code
0x06. The communication between the Android mobile and
the fake device is downgraded to plaintext as discussed in
Design Flaw 3. We configure the permission of the attributes
of the fake device as read/write so that the access to the at-
tributes does not require any pairing. The fake device can
then inject false data to the mobile. This attack cannot be
easily detected since the Android mobile does not delete the
original LTK. Therefore, even if the user checks the list of
bonded devices at the Android mobile’s system settings, the
list will not show any aberrations.
In the case of blood pressure monitoring, the false data in-
jection attack may inject false blood pressure readings and
misguide the doctors or nurses. Please note here we assume
a scenario where BLE is adopted to connect medical equip-
ment such as blood pressure monitors or x-ray imaging tools
to data collecting equipment such as the tablet of a doctor
or nurse. The purpose is to illustrate the potential threats of
design flaws of Android.
Spoofing attack on sensitive information via Design
Flaw 3: In addition to the false data injection attack, the
attacker can also utilize Design Flaw 3 and perform traffic
analysis of the Android mobile. Through the use of Design
Flaw 3, the attacker downgrades the communication to plain-
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text and the fake device can communicate with the Android
mobile. Therefore, the fake device is positioned to receive
any sensitive information from the Android mobile. We find
that many IoT applications implement an application layer
password mechanism for the user verification. When an au-
thorized user inputs the password, the fake device can collect
this password.
Stealing Android mobile’s IRK and MAC address via
Design Flaws 1, 2 and 3: To protect the MAC address from
leakage, an Android mobile with API 23 or above uses IRK
introduced in Section 2.3.3 by default [41]. According to our
experiments, the IRK is generated when the Android device
is configured for the first time from the factory settings.
It will not change until the device is reset to the factory
settings. Any peer BLE device paired with the Android
device will receive the same IRK and obtain the mobile’s
real MAC address.
To obtain the IRK and MAC address of a victim Android
mobile, the fake device needs to intentionally create a 0x06
error message. The communication between the Android
mobile and the fake device is then downgraded to plaintext.
The attacker also configures the permission of the attributes
on the fake device as encrypted read/write. When the An-
droid app tries to access these attributes, the fake device
sends a “0x05” error message to the Android mobile, which
starts a pairing process accordingly because of the Design
Flaw 3. The fake device is configured to have no I/O capa-
bilities so that the Android Mobile and the fake device pair
with Just Works (See Design Flaws 1 and 2). Through the
Step 10 in Figure 2, the Android mobile distributes the IRK
and MAC address to the attacker. With the IRK, the attacker
can perform the private address resolution and trace the iden-
tity of the Android Mobile every time the mobile uses BLE.
We have confirmed this attack in our experiments. This at-
tack defeats the purpose of IRK, which is used to prevent an
Android mobile from being tracked.
Denial of Service (DoS) via Design Flaws 1,2,3 and 4:
The goal of this DoS attack is to disrupt the communication
between a victim mobile and its peer BLE device. According
to the IRK stealing attack above, an attacker can first pair a
fake device with a victim Android device using Just Works.
This pairing process creates a new LTK for the mobile. The
attacker then turns off the fake device. The mobile then tries
to communicate with the victim device. However, since the
LTK on the mobile and the LTK on the victim device are now
different, we find that Android cannot detect the two LTKs
are different and the communication enters into a deadlock.
As we mentioned in Design Flaw 4, there is no public API
for an app to remove a bond on the mobile. The app cannot
remove the bond or restart the pairing process. The deadlock
can only be resolved by manually removing the bond in the
Android system setting.
4.4 Attacks Beyond Mobiles
We have introduced attacks against Android mobiles. It is
intuitive that those attacks will affect the peer BLE devices
paired with the mobiles. We now discuss the attacks beyond
mobiles. The threat model for the attacks against peer BLE
devices is different from the threat model for attacks against
mobiles. In attacks against mobiles, we assume that the at-
tacker cannot touch or unlock the victim mobiles. This is
a reasonable assumption because people intend to tend their
mobiles carefully. However, the attacker may have physi-
cal access to BLE devices in various scenarios. For exam-
ple, IoT products such as smart lights may be placed outside.
Few people physically lock away their BLE keyboards and
attackers may press keys of those BLE keyboards. There-
fore, we consider the following two attack scenarios against
peer BLE devices of mobiles.
Case 1. The attacker can physically access the victim
BLE device. Given a mobile cannot enforce secure pairing,
an attacker with physical access to the peer BLE device can
always launch an MITM attack even if the victim peer de-
vice uses the Secure Connections Only mode enforcing se-
cure pairing. To deploy the MITM attack, a fake device con-
nects to the victim mobile using the scheme in the false data
injection attack. Since an attacker can touch and play with
a victim peer device, she can always pair a fake mobile with
the victim device, which may use any pairing protocol, even
if the victim device enforces the Secure Connections Only
mode. We show later even if the attackers can have physi-
cal access to peer BLE devices, once the secure connections
only mode is enforced at both the Android device and peer
device, our defense can still defeat those attackers.
Case 2. The attacker cannot physically access the de-
vice. We also assume that before the attack, the Android
mobile and its peer device are paired using secure pairing
protocols such as Passkey Entry and Numerical Comparison.
Section 2 shows that two secure measures can be adopted
to protect sensitive data on a device, namely pairing and
attribute permissions. Secure pairing protects the commu-
nication and attribute permissions limit access to attributes
based on adopted pairing protocols. We find that attribute
permissions are often misused and the misused permissions
will cause security issues.
Passive eavesdropping attack. This attack works when
the victim device has only read/write attributes. We assume
that before the attack, the mobile pairs with the peer device
that uses the Secure Connections Only mode. To launch this
attack, the attacker first blocks the victim device. A fake de-
vice is then used to perform the 0x06 error attack so that the
communication between the fake device and the victim mo-
bile is downgraded to plaintext. The fake device then goes
offline and the blocker is turned off. We find that the victim
mobile then communicates with the victim peer BLE device
in plaintext and will be able to access the the peer device’s
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read/write attributes. Since the communication is in plain-
text, the attacker can eavesdrop on the communication and
retrieve sensitive information using a sniffer. Similar to the
false data injection attack, even if the user checks the bonded
devices list at the mobile’s system settings, no abnormalities
will be observed.
Bypassing the whitelist. A BLE device may use a
whitelist of MAC address and IRK to allow connections only
from an already paired mobile. As discussed above, an at-
tacker can steal a victim mobile’s MAC address and IRK.
Therefore a fake mobile with the same MAC address and
IRK can bypass the whitelist mechanism and will be allowed
to connect to the victim peer BLE device. Even if the vic-
tim BLE device uses the Secure Connections Only mode,
the fake mobile can still access read/write attributes of the
BLE device after bypassing the whitelist. If the permission
of the attributes of the BLE device is encrypted read/write
or authenticated read/write, the fake mobile has to pair with
the peer device to access the attributes. If the BLE device
enforces the Secure Connections Only mode or the attribute
permission is authenticated read/write, the fake mobile has
to perform secure pairing with the peer BLE device and may
not be able to perform the attack. Recall that an authen-
ticated read/write attribute requires secure pairing from the
mobile. The attack in Section 5 presents a case study show-
ing bypassing the whitelist leads to end-to-end MITM at-
tacks against BLE keyboards .
5 Case Studies
In this section, we present case studies to demonstrate our
attacks against Android and actual BLE products including
BLE blood pressure monitors, smart lights, keyboards. Fig-
ure 7 in Appendix C shows 18 popular BLE products from
various vendors that we have tested, including Logitech’s
K380 and K780 Keyboards [42], Microsoft’s Designer Key-
board [43], two blood pressure (BP) monitors from iHealth
[44], and QardioArm blood pressure monitor [45], TNG’s
Blood glucose meter [46], Flux light [47], Magic Hue light
[48], Magic Light [49], and MPOW light. Because of the
page limit, please refer to Appendix C on the case study
of blood pressure monitors demonstrating (i) the false data
injection attack by exploiting Android mobiles (ii) passive
eavesdropping attack against blood pressure monitors; the
case study of smart lights demonstrating the spoofing attack
stealing passwords with a fake light; the case study of
popular Texas Instruments (TI)’s CC26XX development
boards demonstrating the IRK and MAC address stealing
attack and how we utilize it to control any BLE device using
CC26XX, which implements the Secure Connections Only
mode. All the attacks are launched without physical access
to the Android Mobile and peer device. We focus on the
case study of BLE Keyboards in this section.
In this BLE Keyboard case study, we exploit a BLE key-
User Attacker
Figure 3: MITM attack against a BLE keyboard from Log-
itech (An anonymous demo video is at https://stream
able.com/jgflo. Please note there is no IP tracking. The
attacking device is powered by a battery.)
board paired with an Android tablet to demonstrate (i) the
attack to steal an Android mobile’s IRK and MAC address
and (ii) the attack to bypass the whitelist of the keyboard.
Based on these two attacks, we also deploy the MITM attack
against a victim keyboard. We have implemented the MITM
attack against the BLE keyboard with two TI CC2640 devel-
opment boards in a case as shown in Figure 3. One board
works as a fake tablet connecting to the victim BLE key-
board and the other as the fake BLE keyboard connecting to
the victim tablet.
To steal the tablet’s IRK and MAC address, we create a
fake keyboard, which has the same MAC address and name
as the victim keyboard. The fake keyboard has a higher ad-
vertising frequency so that it has better chance to connect to
the victim tablet instead of the victim keyboard. We do not
use a blocker here to block the victim BLE keyboard because
a BLE keyboard often implements the whitelist mechanism
and accepts only a previously paired mobile. The fake key-
board leverages the attack in Section 4.3 to obtain the IRK
and MAC address of the victim tablet.
The fake tablet with the stolen IRK and MAC address
can bypass the whitelist mechanism of the victim keyboard.
Since the current BLE Human Interface Device (HID) profile
[50] does not enforce the Secure Connections Only mode and
requires only encrypted (not authenticated) read/write per-
mission for keyboard services, the fake tablet can remotely
pair with the keyboard with Just Works. The fake tablet and
fake keyboard can then deploy a MITM attack.
6 Countermeasures
In this section, we try to address the design flaws discussed
in Section 3 and present solutions on how to enforce secure
pairing within Android. The Secure Connections Only mode
shall be implemented as a configurable option for apps to
defeat the presented attacks. We have implemented a proto-
type on Android 8 through the Android Open Source Project
(AOSP) [25]. Please note co-located attacks through mal-
wares are addressed in [5, 14, 36, 37] and are out of the scope
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of this work.
6.1 Overview
For a mission critical application, the app knows the peer
device’s I/O capabilities, which should support secure pair-
ing. With the Secure Connections Only mode enabled at the
mobile, the user has to physically authenticate a BLE device.
If the negotiated pairing protocol between the mobile and its
peer device is not the specified one, the communication shall
be rejected and a critical security warning shall be directed
to the user. Extra cost of a display or a keyboard and the
usability issue of implementing secure pairing protocols
may be associated with the proposed solutions.
6.2 Enforcing Secure Pairing
Addressing Design Flaws 1 and 2: specifying a secure
pairing protocol. An Android mobile can enforce a secure
pairing protocol after the mobile and peer device have deter-
mined the pairing protocol through the exchanged I/O capa-
bilities, i.e., after Step 6 and before Step 7 in Figure 2. If the
negotiated pairing protocol is not the specified secure pairing
protocol, Android should reject further actions and gives the
user a security warning. The Android BLE service and stack
shall cache the specified secure pairing protocol in memory
and save it in a configuration file on its nonvolatile storage if
bonding is requested.
To address Design Flaw 1, an app can use our function
specifyPairing(.) to store the specified pairing protocol in a
configuration file scm.conf through the Java Native Inter-
face (JNI). specifyPairing(.) is a system API. It can program-
matically obtain the app’s package name. scm.conf is
in the system folder /data/misc/bluedroid/ and stores
the app’s package name and metadata including the specified
pairing protocol. An app cannot manipulate metadata of an-
other app. When the pairing process starts, Android uses the
system function smp_proc_pair_cmd() to exchange the
pairing features with the peer device. The bits in an integer
peer_io_caps are used to indicate the peer device’s I/O
capabilities. Therefore, smp_proc_pair_cmd() can know
the negotiated pairing protocol through announced I/O ca-
pabilities. In smp_proc_pair_cmd(), we read the config-
uration file scm.conf and obtain the app’s specified pair-
ing protocol. If the specified pairing protocol and negotiated
pairing protocol do not match, smp_proc_pair_cmd()
sends the error code SMP_PAIR_AUTH_FAIL to the peer
BLE device, halts the pairing process, breaks the connection
and sends warning messages to the user.
Note that smp_proc_pair_cmd() can obtain the nego-
tiated pairing protocol at the earliest possible time. This also
addresses Design Flaw 2. An app knows its specified pairing
protocol will be enforced. If it cannot be enforced, the user
will receive a security warning. Multiple apps on one mo-
bile device could request pairing with the same BLE device
although we did not find such use. If those apps require dif-
ferent pairing protocols, the one of the highest security shall
be used.
Addressing Design Flaw 3: enforcing the specified par-
ing protocol when errors occur. The 0x06 error occurs be-
cause the fake device does not have the LTK. The 0x05 error
occurs because the BLE connection does not have the per-
mission to access the attributes on the fake device. Android
does not notify the user these errors and starts its own (vul-
nerable) pairing protocol. We address the design flaw as fol-
lows. If there is any such pairing related error, the Android
BLE service shall notify the user and ask the user whether
to pair with the peer device. If the BLE connection has a
specified pairing protocol and the user chooses to pair with
the peer device, Android will enforce the specified pairing
protocol and give the user a security warning if it cannot be
enforced.
Addressing Design Flaw 4: removing suspicious bond
and starting a new secure pairing. An app shall be able to
remove its own bonded devices whenever needed. We make
the system API removeBond() available to applications. re-
moveBond() is redesigned so that an app can only remove
its own bond, not bonds of other apps. Therefore, a bond
shall maintain metadata including the app’s package name.
removeBond() will obtain the calling app’s package name
and can remove only its own bond. To deal with the rare
case that multiple apps use the same device, we can use a
mechanism similar to the Linux hard link [51]. A counter is
used to record the number of paired apps.
6.3 Security Analysis
We now discuss BLE pairing security if Android addresses
the design flaws and enforces secure pairing, and the peer
BLE device also enforces secure pairing. Under the assump-
tion that an attacker cannot physically access the mobile or
peer BLE device, the attacks in Section 4 will fail since se-
cure pairing requires the attacker (fake mobile) see the victim
device and the mobile see the attacker (fake device).
As discussed in Section 4.4, the assumption of no physical
access is not always true. Although we can assume the at-
tacker cannot physically access a mobile, we cannot assume
the attacker cannot always access a BLE device such as a
BLE keyboard. if an attacker can physically touch a BLE
keyboard that uses the Passkey Entry pairing protocol, even
if both the keyboard and mobile enforces passkey entry, the
attacker can still perform the MITM attack as follows. The
Passkey Entry pairing protocol is secure only if the attacker
cannot obtain the passkey. However, the BLE keyboard is a
human input device, which sends whatever keystrokes to a
mobile device as long as the mobile device is paired with the
keyboards. As shown in Figure 4, if the attacker can physi-
cally access the keyboard, she can pair the fake mobile with
the keyboard by entering a chosen passkey when the user is
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Figure 4: The work-flow of attacking the Keyboard with
Passkey Entry enforced
away from the device. The fake keyboard later pretends to
be the real one and starts a pairing process with the user’s
victim mobile. The victim mobile enforces Passkey Entry
and requires the user enter a passkey displayed on the vic-
tim mobile. However, when the user enters the passkey on
the victim keyboard, the fake mobile receives the user en-
tered passkey. The fake mobile then sends the passkey to the
fake keyboard, which can then use the passkey to connect to
the victim mobile. The attacker can now perform the MITM
attack.
The MITM attack above will fail when the victim mobile
and keyboard enforce the Numeric Comparison pairing
protocol even under the assumption that the attacker can
physically access the keyboard. To implement Numerical
Comparison, the keyboard must have a display. The
attacker’s fake mobile can still be paired with the victim
keyboard because of the assumption of physical access.
However, when the user pairs the victim keyboard with the
victim mobile, the user has to compare the two numbers
displayed on the victim keyboard and the victim mobile.
With the underlying Numerical Comparison protocol, if
the attacker performs the MITM attack with a fake mobile
and a fake keyboard in the middle, the two numbers on the
victim keyboard and the victim mobile will be different. The
MITM attack will be detected and fail.
Based on the analysis above, it can be observed that
under the assumption that the attacker can physically ac-
cess the keyboard, Numerical Comparison is more secure
than Passkey Entry. When we enforce secure pairing, Nu-
merical Comparison provides the strongest pairing security.
The BLE specification treats Passkey Entry and Numeric
Comparison equally and these two secure pairing proto-
cols have the same security level - authenticated-and-MITM-
protection. In the specification, if either of the two proto-
cols is applied, the connection is considered as authenticated.
This term is not accurate based on our analyses.
7 Attack and Defense Evaluations
In this section, we first evaluate our attacks, and then eval-
uate our defense measures and its feasibility.
Table 2: Summary of Android mobiles under testing
Brand OS
Samsung Galaxy S8+ Samsung Official Android 7.0
Google Pixel 2 AOSP Android 8.0
Samsung Tablet Samsung Official Android 8.1
Samsung Note 8 Samsung Official Android 8.1
Google Pixel 2 AOSP Android 9.0
Table 3: BLE apps at Androzoo
Apps Quantity
BLE apps 3501
BLE apps using createBond() 176
BLE Apps using intents for pairing
status
29
7.1 Android OSes
We tested all design flaws on the mainstream Android ver-
sions, from 7.0 to 9.0 and find that all our attacks can be
performed with no adjustments (see Table 2). Recall that a
fake device may use the 0x05 error in Section 3 to stealthily
pair with the victim mobile through Just Works. This ap-
proach works under all versions of Android we tested. On
Android 7.0, a fake device can also send a security request
as introduced in Section 2.3.1 to stealthily pair with the vic-
tim mobile while the security request on higher versions of
Android will raise a pairing request dialog window asking
the user for permission. Such a dialog Window may alert the
user.
7.2 BLE App Security
To evaluate the security of BLE apps, we collected 3501
Android apps from the Androzoo database [24], which ac-
tively collects apps from all major Android app stores in-
cluding Google Play. All 3501 BLE apps we evaluated are
subject to our downgrade attacks. Specifically, we build a
tool based on the public framework soot [52] to scan An-
droid apps and examine how they perform pairing related
functionalities. Androzoo provides a set of RESTful APIs
[53] to query apps of interest. To find BLE related apps, we
set the query condition as apps that use connectGatt(), which
a BLE app must use to connect to a peer BLE device. Among
the collected 3501 BLE apps, only 176 apps use the create-
Bond() to explicitly start a pairing process and 29 apps use
the intent mechanism (see Table 3).
We manually analyze the 29 apps that use the intent
ACTION_BOND_STATE_CHANGED or ACTION_PAIRING_R
EQUEST. These intents are used for various reasons. Some
apps register the intents to determine if the mobile is bonded
with the intended device so that it can transmit data. This
cannot deter our downgrade attacks since the victim mobile
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Figure 5: Impact of advertising frequency
and the victim peer device are bonded under our attacks. We
also find that many apps using the programming frameworks
in a faulty way. Some apps use ACTION_PAIRING_REQUE
ST to determine if Passkey Entry or Numeric Comparison
is used with the consideration of usability rather than secu-
rity. These apps automatically input a fixed passkey for the
Passkey Entry pairing protocol or “click” the confirmation
button for Numeric Comparison when its peer device adopts
Numeric Comparison. These strategies make Passkey En-
try and Numeric Comparison useless since the user is not
involved.
7.3 Keyboard Connection Competition
As discussed in Section 5, when both the victim keyboard
and a fake keyboard try to connect to the victim mobile, the
one with a higher advertising frequency has a better chance.
We now present the impact of the advertising frequency on
the success rate of the fake keyboard connecting to the vic-
tim mobile. In our experiments, the victim keyboard is put
close to an Android mobile as in a normal use scenario, while
the fake keyboard is 10 meters away from the keyboard. For
each advertising frequency, we perform the connection com-
petition game 20 times. The success rate is the number of
successful connections by our fake keyboard over 20. Figure
5 shows the success rate versus the advertising frequency.
The success rate is 50% when the advertising frequency of
the fake keyboard is 30HZ. The BLE specification sets the
highest advertising frequency as 50 HZ, at which the success
rate by the fake keyboard is 75%. We use CC2640 for the
fake keyboard, which does not work when the advertising
frequency is beyond 50HZ.
7.4 Countermeasure Evaluations
We have implemented our defense techniques on a
Google Pixel 2 mobile through the AOSP. We launched
all our attacks and confirmed that they failed under the
patched Android system. For example, in the case of the
BLE keyboard, when Numerical Comparison is enforced,
the user finds that the two numbers displayed on the victim
mobile and keyboard (emulated by a CC2640) are different
10 20 30
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
550.6
731.1
892.5
Ti
m
e 
(u
s)
Number of Apps
Figure 6: Defense performance
when the MITM attack is deployed. The user shall reject the
pairing and investigate the possibility of attacks.
We also evaluate the performance of our secure pairing
strategy, i.e. the overhead caused by the query of the config-
uration file scm.conf for a specific app’s metadata such as the
specified pairing protocol. We tested three cases: 10, 20 and
30 BLE apps using our defense mechanisms on the security
enhanced Android mobile. The app of interest is always set
as the last one in scm.conf. That is, we consider the worst
case of time needed to find the metadata of the app of inter-
est. We run the test for each case 10 times and derive the
average time. As shown in Figure 6, the average delay is
from 550.6µs to 892.5µs and is feasible for typical use of
BLE apps in a mobile [54].
8 Discussions
8.1 Securing Pairing on iOS
According to the iOS developer guidelines [55], iOS does
not provide a way of enforcing secure pairing protocols ei-
ther. We also performed all developed attacks against iOS.
The false data injection and spoofing attack for sensitive in-
formation are the same against iOS. That is, when the 0x06
error occurs, the iOS will not notify the app and user and
run the vulnerable protocols similar to Android. The down-
grade attack stealing the IRK and mobile’s address does not
work since iOS does not respond to the 0x05 error and does
not notify the user the error either. This could be a prob-
lem of iOS since it misses the error processing. An attacker
may steal the IRK and MAC address in another way. We
find some apps try to pair with any device of the same model
and manufacturer automatically. Since iOS cannot enforce
secure pairing, a fake device emulating a device of the same
model and manufacturer can use Just Works to pair with iOS.
In this case, iOS displays an innocuous dialog box and shows
a message such as “Device X would like to pair with your
iPhone”, where Device X is the peer device’s name. If the
user clicks the “Pair” button, the attacker obtains the IRK
and MAC address of the iPhone. The DoS attack does not
work against iOS since iOS does not respond to the 0x05
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error.
8.2 Other Solutions to BLE Security
There are other ways to secure BLE communication.
Many chips such as TI’s CC3220 [56] now support crypto
accelerators or can be equipped with a low-cost co-processor
such as ATECC608A which only costs ($0.55) [57]. Each
device is equipped with a pair of (public key, private key).
The private key is stored in the secure storage while the
public key is published, for example, as a tamper resistant
QR code label on the device’s exterior. A mobile can now
get the device’s public key and use public key cryptography
such as Elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) to implement a
SSL/TLS-like protocol at the application layer to secure its
communication with the peer device, using BLE as only a
wireless media. The disadvantage of this approach is it re-
quires extra hardware support.
Another approach is we assume there is no attack the first
time the user configures the mobile and device, which can
share a secret to protect later communication. The disadvan-
tage of this approach is the assumption may not be true. Our
solution of enforcing secure pairing at both the mobile and
device can address these issues while defeating other attacks
such as co-located attacks requires extra remedies and is ad-
dressed in [14, 36, 37].
9 Related Work
Vulnerabilities in Bluetooth: Bluetooth before the Sim-
ple Secure Pairing (SSP) is not secure [58–62] and is out
of scope of this paper. The Simple Secure Pairing is also
vulnerable. For example, Haataja et al. [19, 63] proposed
MITM attacks against SSP of Bluetooth Classic (versions
2.1 and 3.0) in 2010. They assumed that the victim devices
use only I/O capabilities to determine the pairing strategy
and the attacking devices can pair with victim devices using
Just Works. The latest BLE introduces the Secure Connec-
tions Only mode in order to defeat those attacks. Our work
focuses on the Secure Connections Only mode in Android.
Mike Ryan [16] built a BLE sniffer over Ubertooth and
demonstrated that the Passkey Entry pairing protocol for
LE legacy connections is not secure. His tool crackle can
crack such connections and target BLE 4.0 and 4.1. Our
paper addresses the latest BLE 4.2 and 5.x, which are con-
sidered secure against his attacks. The work by Rosa [17]
is similar to Mike Ryan’s work. Working in the area of
telemedicine, Zegeye et al. cracked the BLE temporary key
used in the pairing process by using a brute-force attack [13],
which also extends the attack in [16]. Dazhi Sun et al. [64]
proposed a method that can break Passkey Entry when the
passkey is reused. The similar problem was also discussed
in [65]. However, reusing a passkey is not recommended in
BLE, which requires a random passkey shall be used in each
pairing session with Passkey Entry. We assume a random
passkey in this paper.
Bluetooth attacks on mobiles: Jasek et al. [9] studied
possible attacks between a Bluetooth smart device and its
mobile app. However, they study BLE 4.0 and 4.1, which do
not have the Secure Connections Only mode for BLE. They
attacked Passkey Entry with Mike Ryan’s approach [16].
Many works reverse engineer particular products [15, 66–69]
and exploit the faulty app protocols while we focus on the
operating system level and programming framework issues.
For example, Britt Cyr et al. performed a security analysis
of wearable fitness devices [15]. They reverse engineered
the devices, BLE communication traffic, and app, and used
Mike Ryan’s attacks against pairing. Zhang et al. analyzed
the commands from four popular smart wristbands by sniff-
ing packets without reverse engineering the apps [67], and
presented replay and MITM attacks against those particular
wristbands. Brian Cusack et al. investigated vulnerabilities
of BLE in mainstream wearable devices [68], and showed
that most of the wearables are subject to privacy disclosure.
BlueBorne [70] explored faulty BLE implementations. our
attacks are not based on those issues. William et al. [71] and
Melamed et al. [7] studied the spoofing attack and MITM
attack between a Bluetooth smart device and its mobile app.
They presented the software based and hardware based at-
tacks, but did not address how to attack two paired devices
with a secure pairing protocol. Fawaz et al. [72] collected
and analyzed the advertisement packets from 214 BLE de-
vices. They found that the poor design and implementation
of BLE advertisements may lead to privacy leaks. We ad-
dress pairing security in this paper. Muhammad Naveed et
al. [14], Xu et al. [5] and Sivakumaran et al. [36, 37] also
addressed Bluetooth security but not on the pairing process.
10 Conclusion
BLE 4.2 and 5.x have a Secure Connections Only mode to
enforce secure pairing such as Passkey Entry and Numerical
Comparison for BLE devices. However, the BLE specifica-
tion does not explicitly require an initiating device such as a
mobile to support the Secure Connections Only mode. This
creates potential security vulnerabilities against both mobiles
and their peer BLE devices. In this paper, we systemat-
ically investigate Android’s BLE programming framework
and present four design flaws of its pairing protocol. We
then present a suite of downgrade attacks and case studies
exploiting these design flaws against Android mobiles and
peer BLE devices. To defend against these attacks, we patch
the discovered design flaws and enforce secure pairing of
Android. We have also performed extensive evaluations to
validate the discovered attacks and proposed defense mech-
anisms. In our future work, we will implement and evaluate
hardware-supported solutions for BLE security. We will also
explore application layer security solutions for BLE devices.
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Appendix A - BLE Profiles
A Bluetooth profile specifies functionalities and features
of all layers in Figure 1 for a particular class of applica-
tions. A profile can be considered as a specific application.
For example, the Human Interface Device Profile (HID) de-
fines rules that allow a HID device, such as a keyboard, us-
ing Bluetooth to accept inputs from humans and shows the
output to humans. A profile may contain other profiles and
protocols as its building blocks to implement functionalities.
The Generic Access Profile (GAP) defines the basic require-
ments of a Bluetooth device and all Bluetooth devices im-
plement GAP. For example, GAP performs advertising and
scanning.
A smart device can implement the Generic Attribute Pro-
file (GATT), which is built upon the ATT protocol, to ex-
change arbitrary data in the format of attributes with its peer
devices. GATT organizes attributes into services. A ser-
vice contains zero or more characteristics, which are also
attributes and user data containers. A characteristic contains
zero or more descriptors, which provide more metadata. A
primary service provides the primary functionality of the de-
vice. A secondary service can work as a building block and
should be included in the primary service.
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Appendix B - Using Current Android Mecha-
nisms to Detect Pairing protocol
In Listing 2, by registering intent ACTION_PAIRING_R
EQUEST and ACTION_BOND_STATE_CHANGED, an Android
app can asynchronously know the adopted pairing method,
Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison, Just Works or plaintext
communication.
1 boolean numericcomparison=false;
2 boolean passkey=false;
3 boolean justworks=false;
4 boolean plaintext=true;
5
6 // Activity starts; register intents
7 public void OnCreate (){
8 IntentFilter pairingRequestFilter = new
IntentFilter ();
9 pairingRequestFilter.addAction(
BluetoothDevice.ACTION_BOND_STATE_CHANGED);
10 pairingRequestFilter.addAction(
BluetoothDevice.ACTION_PAIRING_REQUEST);
11 registerReceiver(mPairingRequestRecevier ,
pairingRequestFilter);
12 ....
13 }
14
15 ....
16 //Once connected call createBond ()
17 device.createBond ();
18
19 // Process intents and determine pairing method
20 public void onReceive(Context context , Intent
intent) {
21 if (BluetoothDevice.ACTION_PAIRING_REQUEST.
equals(intent.getAction ())){ // either
numeric comparison or passkey is used
22 int pairingtype = intent.getIntExtra(
BluetoothDevice.EXTRA_PAIRING_VARIANT ,
BluetoothDevice.ERROR);
23
24 if(pairingtype == BluetoothDevice.
PAIRING_VARIANT_PASSKEY_CONFIRMATION){
25 numericcomparison=true;
26 plaintext=false;
27 }
28 if(pairingtype == BluetoothDevice.
PAIRING_VARIANT_PIN){
29 Passkey=true;
30 plaintext=false;
31 }
32 }
33
34 if (BluetoothDevice.ACTION_BOND_STATE_CHANGED
.equals(intent.getAction ())) { // Bonding ,
bonded , or bonding none (failure)?
35 int bondstate = intent.getIntExtra(
BluetoothDevice.EXTRA_BOND_STATE ,
BluetoothDevice.ERROR);
36
37 if(bondstate == BluetoothDevice.BOND_BONDED){
38 if(! numericcomparison || !passkey){
39 justworks=true;
40 plaintext=false;
41 }
42 }
43 }
Figure 7: Tested devices in our experiments
44 }
Listing 2: Android determining pairing method after bonded
Appendix C - Case Studies
Blood Pressure Monitors: In this case study, we demon-
strate that (i) the false data injection attack by exploiting An-
droid mobiles; and (ii) passive eavesdropping attack against
blood pressure monitors. Blood pressure monitors in our ex-
periments may use a secure pairing method to pair with an
Android mobile. For example, the iBalance Blood pressure
monitor has a display and a button, and uses the Passkey En-
try to pair with a mobile. The app collects readings from the
monitor. To attack Blood Pressure monitors, we reverse en-
gineered the app to understand its application layer protocol.
We are able to deploy the downgrade attack against the mo-
bile for false data injection. Particularly, a fake monitor is
created using a TI CC2640 development board, which sends
false blood pressure measurements to the mobile. The at-
tributes of all the blood pressure monitors in our experiments
are configured as read/write. Therefore, they are subject to
our passive eavesdropping attack.
Smart Lights: In this case study, we demonstrate that (i)
the spoofing attack stealing passwords by a fake light; and
(ii) DoS attack. Recall that a BLE app may use passwords
to implement authorization and limit who can use the de-
vices. In our experiments, we find the Flux smart light uses
the Passkey Entry pairing protocol. We assume the app uses
secure pairing to securely set up the password on the light.
To steal the password, an attacker can use a blocker to block
the service of the light. A fake light can then be positioned
to connect to the Android mobile when the user opens the
app to use the light. The app will send the password to the
fake light controlled by the attacker, who can then control
the BLE light.
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To deploy the DoS attack, the fake light with the victim
light’s MAC address uses Just Works and pairs with the vic-
tim mobile so that a new LTK will be generated for the victim
mobile. The fake light then goes offline. The communica-
tion between the mobile and the real light then fails since the
LTKs on the two sides are different. As discussed in Section
4.3, the mobile can not access the service provided by the
real light until the user manually removes the bond with the
Android system setting app.
CC26XX Development Boards from Texas Instru-
ments: We now use the case study to demonstrate the impact
of leaking a mobile’s MAC address on BLE devices using TI
chips. TI is a leading BLE chip manufacturer, which imple-
ments multiple security levels for its widely used BLE chips.
We find two critical vulnerabilities in TI’s BLE SDK.
First, the TI’s BLE SDK incorrectly implements the Se-
cure Connections Only mode. TI’s SDK allows an applica-
tion to set a Secure Connections Only mode flag as true or
false. However, the related code only checks if the incom-
ing pairing request enables the Secure Connections (SC) bit
and does not check if the negotiated pairing protocol is the
Passkey Entry or Numerical Comparison protocol. The SC
bit only refers to if a mobile or its peer BLE device supports
BLE 4.2 and 5.x. However, their BLE Stack SDK provides
the GAP Bong Manager layer (re: “related code”) in source
code format which allows the application to inspect and per-
form accordingly based on the peer IO Capabilities field.
Second, the TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the
LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be
an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by
Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key
created by Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison or OOB. As-
sume that a victim mobile uses secure pairing to pair with
a victim BLE device based on TI chips and generate an
authenticated-and-MITM-protection LTK. If a fake mobile
with the victim mobile’s MAC address uses Just Works and
pairs with the victim device, the generated LTK still has the
property of authenticated-and-MITM-protection. Therefore,
the fake mobile can access attributes with the authenticated
read/write permission. We have tested and proved the vulner-
abilities on TI’s CC2640, CC2640R2F, and CC2650, and re-
ported the identified vulnerabilities to TI and a patched SDK
was released recently [27, 28].
18
